During the first decades of the twenty-first century, a specific type of public communication, which researchers call network communication, took shape in the Ukrainian information space. It is characterized by weak vertical communication between the government and society, and at the same time by the possibility of alternative centers of narrative production if there is passion and resources. An example of this is the narrative leadership of volunteer units in the formation of military discourse during the Russian-Ukrainian war, when the public position of representatives of the volunteer movement contributed to decision-making at the level of the state’s top military and political leadership. On the other hand, the network model of communication in decision-making blurs the hierarchy of authorized subjects in the information space, making it difficult to determine a clear point of decision-making and responsibility for its adoption. The challenges of a full-scale war have exposed several weaknesses in the network model of communication.
First, the numerous but under-resourced and limited in terms of audience communication channels were losing the fight for Ukraine’s image to channels coordinated and funded by the Russian state, especially when it came to informing foreign audiences about the situation. The example of the confrontation between grassroots religious initiatives on the Ukrainian side and a targeted lobbying campaign on the Russian side in the issue of shaping the narrative on freedom of conscience in Ukraine in the United States in the first half of 2023 is illustrative. The Ukrainian side acted in a piecemeal manner and with a delay, through the efforts of religious leaders and civil society, with insufficient attention from the state. Instead, the Russian side used classic propaganda tools, ranging from repeatedly convening the UN Security Council to hiring professional lobbyists to promote the narrative of religious persecution in Ukraine. As a result, at the end of 2023, the US political circles (primarily the Republican ones) started to talk about Ukraine as an undemocratic state and call for the termination of military aid.
Secondly, initiatives that had no ideological basis and only tried to objectively inform about events did not become influential in narrative terms. As the author of the
of the study
“Resilience of Communities through the Prism of Telegram in the Occupied, De-occupied, Frontline and Rear Areas” by K. Ilyuk, “local Telegram channels were mainly focused on hyperlocal issues, including social and infrastructure problems, thus meeting the immediate needs of their audience. Russia capitalized on this trend by maintaining channels in the “occupied,” “frontline,” and “de-occupied” categories that published practical information such as pharmacy and store hours. This strategy has allowed Russia to quietly influence the information space by incorporating its narratives into the context of everyday life, which makes it difficult to distinguish between truthful information and potential propaganda and ultimately increases the effectiveness of Russia’s information campaigns in the region.” On the other hand, channels united by a common ideological base – even small ones – were able to reach a large audience due to their networking, as exemplified by the effective practice of opening “micro-cans” at Monobank, which allow for the rapid collection of large amounts of money for large-scale gatherings.
Third, the lack of experience of state leadership in the information space has led to the emergence of contradictory communication formats. In particular, the “United News” telethon, which only briefly satisfied the need for official information, but eventually lost credibility among experts and the public. According to the results of the
of the survey
conducted in February 2024 by KIIS, “the idea of the ‘United News’ telethon enjoyed wide support in 2022, but since 2023 there has been a steady decline in trust… Thus, in December 2023, 43% trusted the “United News” telethon, while 38% did not. As of the beginning of February 2024, the share of those who trusted the system dropped to 36%. Instead, the share of those who do not trust has increased to 47%.” Experts also noted other negative trends in the official communication of the authorities, in particular, when the most important news was first announced in interviews with international media and only later broadcast in national media, which gave grounds to accuse the authorities of neglecting communication with their fellow citizens.
At the same time, the situation of the Russian-Ukrainian war contributed to the development of grassroots civic initiatives, which, given a clear ideological platform and sufficient authority in society, began to claim narrative leadership both in the Ukrainian information space and internationally. In some cases, they have become independent actors in the field of building narratives about the war, successfully competing for information subjectivity with state institutions. In this context, the initiatives of some politicians to limit the participation of CSOs in communicating information about Ukraine to the international community are a matter of justified concern. In particular, we are talking about
Draft law No. 11104
which provided for punishment in the form of life imprisonment for unauthorized appropriation of state functions, including speeches at international events and communication with international organizations. After a wave of criticism, the draft law was withdrawn, but it was its introduction to the Parliament by representatives of the ruling party that showed negative trends in the regulation of freedom of speech.
Thus, the network model of communication during the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war demonstrated both strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand, it has allowed civic initiatives to take responsibility in situations where public authorities are unable to provide narrative leadership. At the same time, the information space is being transformed towards greater control by the state, which is caused by risks to national security, but is perceived negatively by citizens due to the lack of communication from the authorities. On the other hand, fragmentation and lack of resources, as well as the absence of a unified ideological platform, result in small grassroots initiatives losing out to well-funded Russian EITI instruments. At the same time, even grassroots initiatives that have a clear ideology and recognizable image can have narrative leadership in both the national and international information space, as well as effectively perform other tasks.